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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CIVIL CASES
T HERE undoubtedly remain many perplexing problems concern-
ing the meaning and application of the exclusionary rule1 in
criminal trials,' but the most unsettled question relates to its applica-
tion to civil trials. Does an individual have a right to have evidence
excluded on the grounds that it was seized in violation of the fourth
amendment when he is subject, not to a criminal prosecution, but
rather to a civil suit instituted either by the government or by a pri-
vate citizen? There are statements by the United States Supreme
Court which are cited for the proposition that the fourth amendment
and the exclusionary rule apply to all cases,3 and others which are
cited for the proposition that their application is limited solely to
criminal prosecutions.' The difficulty involved in evaluating such
authority is that in none of these cases was the Court specifically ad-
dressing itself to the problem of the application of the fourth amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule to civil cases.' In only one case, One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,' has the Supreme Court so ad-
dressed itself. In that case the Court held that evidence seized illegal-
ly by state agents could not be introduced into evidence in forfeiture
proceedings. The first problem discussed in this Note deals with the
1 The rule set forth in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and made appli-
cable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), excludes all evidence in crim-
inal trials obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
2 See generally Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L. J.
319.
3 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) the Court said:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limita-
tions and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever
secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreason-
able searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all
alike, whether accused of crime or not .... (Emphasis added.)
Similarly in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920),
the Court said: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not he used at all." (Emphasis added.)
4 In Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) the Court said:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action.
Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies .... (Emphasis added.)
5 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) was a criminal trial involving illegal
seizure of documents. The statement in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920) was made in reference to a subpoena for documents that had
been illegally seized and returned. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) was
a criminal trial in which evidence illegally seized by private individuals was turned over
to the government.
6 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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applicability of this holding to other civil suits in which the govern-
ment is a party, and the second involves the application of the exclu-
sionary rule in private actions where the government is not a party.
I. CIVIL SUITS IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT Is A PARTY
A. Forfeiture Proceedings
This area is the more settled of the two, particularly since the
decisive opinion in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan.7 Until this decision
the circuit courts were split on the question of whether illegally seized
evidence could be offered into evidence in forfeiture proceedings In
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan two Pennsylvania officers stationed at the
New Jersey border noticed a car entering Pennsylvania which ap-
peared to be low in the rear. On stopping the car, they found thirty-
one cases of liquor not bearing Pennsylvania tax seals, and imme-
diately seized both the car and the liquor. In accordance with a Penn-
sylvania statute, which declared that no property right existed in any
automobile used to transport illegal liquor and that such an auto was
subject to forfeiture,9 the government instituted an action for for-
feiture of the car. The trial court sustained the defendant's conten-
tion that the testimony of the officers concerning the contents of the
car should be excluded because the officers acted without probable
cause, and dismissed the action."0 The superior court reversed and
ordered the automobile forfeited." This order was affirmed by the
state supreme court. 2 The United States Supreme Court reversed and
7 Ibid.
8 The confusion resulted in a large part from the failure of the circuit courts to distin-
guish between the illegality of the search and seizure as affecting the jurisdiction of
the court to entertain the forfeiture proceeding and as affecting the admissibility of
evidence so obtained. It was held in Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926) that
the jurisdiction of the court in a forfeiture proceeding depended solely upon whether
the government had possession of the res at the time of the trial, and the man-
ner in which it obtained possession was irrelevant. This rule is followed in all juris-
dictions. E.g., United States v. 1058 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.
1963) ; United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1958) ;
Sanders v. United States, 201 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Harman v. United States, 199
F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1952). The problem arose when the courts attempted to construe the
language of the Dodge case for the proposition that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in forfeiture proceedings. See United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 185
F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Ky. 1960). The Second, Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts relied on
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and held that evidence illegally obtained
should be excluded in forfeiture cases. E.g., United States v. Five Thousand Six Hun-
dred and Eight Dollars and Thirty Cents in United States Coin and Currency, 326 F.2d
359 (7th Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United
States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946). For further discussion of the con-
fusion see 69 DICK. L. REV. 284 (1965).
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-601 (1952).
10 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, Misc. Liquor Condemnation Docket No. 4,
Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County, Pa., Feb. Term, 1961.
11 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 199 Pa. Super. 428, 186 A.2d 52 (1962).
12 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964).
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remanded for a rehearing on the issue of probable cause. 3 In holding
that the exclusionary rule applied to forfeiture cases, the Court relied
heavily on Boyd v. United States," stating that "although there is this
factual difference between Boyd and the case at bar, nevertheless the
basis of the Boyd holding applies with equal, if not greater, force to
the case before us."", The reasoning of the Court was that although
a forfeiture proceeding is technically civil, it is criminal in substance
because it requires proof of a crime, and because the effect of the
proceeding, loss of the automobile, was punitive rather than com-
pensatory.
Finally .. . a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character.
Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commis-
sion of an offense against the law. ... It would be anomalous in-
deed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal pro-
ceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the for-
feiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal
law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible. That
the forfeiture is dearly a penalty for the criminal offense and can
result in even greater punishment than the criminal prosecution has
in fact been recognized by the Pennsylvania courts. 6
The Court also settled once and for all the distinction between
contraband per se and derivative contraband. The general theory
behind the distinction is that there exists a certain class of articles
which, for the protection of the public, should never be allowed in
the hands of private individuals. The most effective method to insure
that such articles do not find their way back to their original possessor
is to refuse to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence in forfeiture
cases relating to the seizure of the articles. By thus making irrelevant
the legality of the search, the state has only to prove that the indi-
vidual had possession or used the goods in violation of state law.
The courts, however, were not agreed as to the class of goods to which
this reasoning should be applied. Some courts applied it to goods
which, although not intrinsically illegal, were used for illegal pur-
poses. 7 Others applied it only to goods the mere possession of which
was illegal. 8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the former
application in holding that since the statute declares that no property
right exists in any automobile used for the transportation of illegal
13 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702-03 (1965).
14 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In an action by the government to forfeit thirty-five cases of
plate glass imported without payment of custom duties, the Court held that an order for
production of papers and records was in violation of the fourth amendment.
15 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 698 (1965).
16 Id. at 700.
17 United States v. 1058 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1963) (evi-
dence relating to the illegal seizure of money in a gambling raid deemed admissible
because the money was used for illegal purposes).
18 United States v. Burns, 4 F.2d 131 (S.D. Fla. 1925) (illegally seized liquor not admis-
sible in evidence since mere possession was not unlawful per se).
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liquor, the possession of the auto was illegal and evidence relating to
its search and seizure would not be excluded. *" In other words, in de-
termining if the exclusionary rule should be applied, the court did
not rely on the intrinsic nature of a car, which is certainly not such as
to make its possession illegal, but rather on the use to which the car
was put, which did make its possession illegal. The Supreme Court
rejected this application when it stated:
It is apparent that the nature of the property here, though termed
contraband by Pennsylvania, is quite different. There is nothing even
remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. It is only the alleged
use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects Mr.
McGonigle to its possible loss . . . . We, therefore, do not have a
case before us in any way analagous to the contraband involved in
Jeffers and Trupiano and these cases can in no way be deemed to
impair the continued validity of Boyd which, like this case, involved
property not intrinsically illegal in character.20 (Emphasis added).
It can thus be concluded that in a forfeiture case involving an illegal
search or seizure, the exclusionary rule will be applied to all evidence
resulting from the search or seizure except when the goods are "prop-
erty intrinsically illegal in character."'
B. Tax Proceedings
Although the One 1958 Plymouth Sedan case does leave un-
answered a few questions relating to forfeiture proceedings,22 the
most stimulating question deals with its possible application to other
types of civil suits by the government. One area involves tax collec-
tion suits by the government in which the assessment of properties
is based on evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure. The protection of the fourth amendment is usually used as
the basis for an action to restrain collection of the tax,2" or as a de-
fense to a suit in assumpsit by the government.2' Although the pro-
tection has usually been afforded, it has been restricted to cases where
the plaintiff could show that the government acted solely on the
knowledge illegally obtained." One court utilized the fruits doctrine
19 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964).
20 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1965).
21 Id. at 700.
22 An interesting question not yet settled is the effect of an acquittal of the criminal charge
on the forfeiture proceedings. Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) held that
an acquittal on the criminal charge barred the forfeiture proceeding. However, the case
has either been circumscribed or rejected in two later Supreme Court cases: Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) ; Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,
282 U.S. 577 (1931). The Court has based its decisions primarily on the ground that
the issues and burden of proof are different in the two proceedings. Problems relating
to the effect of a conviction on the criminal charge, or no verdict at all, are discussed
in Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1953).
23 Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F.
Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962) ; Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
24 Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
2
5Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
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of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 3' in granting an order
barring the government from using "in any proceeding of any kind" '
the evidence illegally obtained and from "reacquiring it by any
means." I However, it was held in Lord v. Kelley"' that although
the government would be required to return the records illegally
seized, a motion to suppress their use in subsequent criminal or civil
proceedings would not be granted if the government had prior knowl-
edge of the existence of the records.3" It has also been held that il-
legally seized evidence in a tax assessment case may be used to im-
peach the petitioner.1 Such would seem to be in accord with the rule
that illegally seized evidence may be used for impeachment purposes
in criminal cases.3
The One 1958 Plymouth Sedan case should have somewhat of a
solidifying effect on these cases, since the basic reasons behind the
holding in that case seem applicable. First, it appears that many of
the cases involving tax assessment are brought in lieu of a criminal
proceeding because of the realization by the government that a crim-
inal proceeding would fail as a result of the exclusion of the illegally
seized evidence. The terse analysis of such practices in forfeiture
proceedings by Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States,33 cited
in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,"' would seem applicable:
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to
file a civil information against the claimants . . . can he by this de-
vice take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the
claimants of their immunities as citizens, and extort from them a
production of their private papers, or, as an alternative, a confession
of guilt? This cannot be.35
Secondly, although proof of a crime is not required in these cases,
and the result - the tax - is not criminal in effect, it is clear that
the individual can be subject to penalties as severe as those imposed
in many criminal cases.3 The end result - penalties criminal in na-
ture based on illegally seized evidence - is present.
In the use of the investigative powers of the Internal Revenue
26 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
27 Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
28 Ibid.
29 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963).
3 0 Ibid. In this case the petitioner was required to keep the records by law.
31 Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964).
32 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
3 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
34 380 U.S. at 697.
35 116 U.S. at 634.
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203, among other things, makes it a misdemeanor, punish-
able by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than a year, or
both, for failure to keep records or supply information as required by law or regulation.
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Service there is little doubt that where the evidence is obtained by
"stealth or trickery" it will be excluded. 7 The unsettled area seems
to concern the use by the Internal Revenue Service of its power to
subpoena taxpayers' records.38 The most frequent grounds for exclu-
sion are that the subpoena constitutes an unreasonable search and
seizure because it lacks specificity,39 or because it imposes an oppres-
sive burden on the taxpayer." Since for failing to comply with a sub-
poena a taxpayer can be found in contempt of court,"' as well as fined
as much as 1,000 dollars, imprisoned for a year, or both,' it seems
that the reasoning used in the case of tax assessments would be ap-
plicable and require that all evidence obtained as a result of a sub-
poena issued without probable cause be excluded.
C. Condemnation Proceedings
The holding in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan should have a de-
termined effect on the body of case law holding that the protections
of the fourth amendment do not apply in condemnation proceedings
under the Federal Food and Drug Act.' It has been held: in a pro-
ceeding for condemnation of tuna fish, the order of attachment does
not require a finding of probable cause;" misrepresentation of pur-
pose by an inspector will not exclude evidence thereby obtained;4
there need be no verification of probable cause in the affidavit sup-
porting the condemnation proceeding." One of the reasons given for
the holdings in such cases is that since a condemnation proceeding is a
proceeding in rem, as opposed to a proceeding in personam, the owner
of the goods is not entitled to raise the protections of the fourth
amendment. 7 This distinction, relied on by the Pennsylvania Supreme
3 See generally De Reuil, Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 1963
DUKE L.J. 472; Gordon, When Can Records Be Withheld During Tax Investigations?,
17 J. TAXATION 174 (1962) ; Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investiga-
tions, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 676 (1957).
38 See articles cited note 37 supra.
39 See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (not too indefinite) ; Wil-
son v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (suitably specific) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906) (too sweeping to be reasonable).
40 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947) (subpoena requiring
bank to produce six million records for inspection unreasonable). But see, United
States v. First Nat'l Bank, 295 Fed. 142 (S.D. Ala. 1924).
41 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604.
42 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7203, 7210.
43 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964).
44 United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish, 5 F.2d 979 (W.D. Va. 1925).
45 United States v. Seventy-Five Cases, 146 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1944).
48 United States v. 935 Cases, 136 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Two Bar-
re!- of Desiccated Eggs, 185 Fed. 302 (D. Minn. 1911) ; United States v. 62 Packages,
48 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1943).
47 In United States v. Seventy-Five Cases, 146 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1944), the court held that
the goods were "outlaws of interstate commerce" and that since the action was not
against the owner he could not raise the protections of the fourth amendment.
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Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,8 and by various other courts in
forfeiture cases,"9 was definitely rejected as immaterial by the United
States Supreme Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. The Court said:
This Court in Boyd v. United States... rejected any argument that
the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding
against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the
goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights.
50
The distinction and its effects would seem to be equally irrele-
vant in condemnation proceedings.
Also, one ground upon which the decision in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan was based - that proof of a crime was necessary - would
seem to have a bearing on these cases. Violation of the provisions in
the Federal Food and Drug Act concerning misbranded and adulter-
ated51 goods not only subjects the goods to condemnation but also
could subject the owner to criminal penalties.2 The most effective
argument for not extending the One 1958 Plymouth Sedan holding
to condemnation proceedings is that misbranded or adulterated goods
represent a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. It will be
recalled that in forfeiture proceedings it was concluded that the ex-
clusionary rule will not apply to illegally seized property that is in-
trinsincally illegal in character, since to exclude the evidence would
be in effect to allow the return of the goods.5 It is submitted that the
same policy consideration would govern in condemnation proceedings,
at least in respect to those instances in which the deficiency could not
readily be corrected or eliminated by the owner.
D. Conclusion
The principal result of the One 1958 Plymouth Sedan case is to
illustrate that the fourth amendment will be applied to civil actions
initiated by the government if the reasons are sufficient. It will be
recalled that the Court approved the application of the fourth amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule because: (1) The proceeding required
proof of a crime; (2) The effect of the proceeding was criminal; and
(3) It appeared that the government frequently brought the civil
action in lieu of a criminal action. Whether its application to other
areas will require all three of these factors, or a combination of any
two, or just one, remains to be seen. True, there was no sweeping
language to the effect that it would be applied in all such cases, but
48 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964).
49 United States v. One 1941 Chrysler Brougham Sedan, 74 F. Supp. 970 (E.D. Mich.
1947) ; United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941).
50380 U.S. at 701 n.ll.
5152 Stat. 1042 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
52 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1964).
53 See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
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neither was there language restricting it to forfeiture cases. In other
areas the lower courts have interpreted the fourth amendment as ap-
plying to civil actions brought by the government when abuses seemed
apparent; 4 when the issue is presented in the future, it should be
considered in light of the statement by Mr. Justice Clark in Gouled
v. United States that the fourth amendment should "receive a liberal
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual
depreciation' of the rights secured by [it,] by [the] imperceptible




If it can be said that the present portends the increasing appli-
cation of the fourth amendment and exclusionary rule to civil actions
by the government, it can also be said that the future holds no such
promise for civil actions by private citizens. In the first place, the
case law indicates no such trend." A sampling of the cases shows
little consistency in approach or result. In Lebel v. Swincicki" a suit
for damages resulting from injuries sustained in a car accident, the
plaintiff attempted to prove the intoxicated condition of the defend-
ant by introducing into evidence blood taken from the defendant
while he was unconscious. The court held that "the taking of blood
for purpose of analysis from the person of one who is unconscious
at the time constitutes a violation of his rights and that testimony...
should not be admitted in evidence."58 This result has been criticized
on the ground that the plaintiff was innocent of any wrongdoing be-
cause it was the hospital that took the blood." In Walker v. Penner,"0
the court allowed into evidence a bottle of whiskey illegally seized
from defendant's car by the plaintiff's husband, stating that the ex-
clusionary rule was limited to cases involving the government. In
cases concerning alienation of affections, one court held that love
letters from the defendant to the plaintiff's husband were admissible
54 In deportation proceedings it has been held reversible error to admit illegally seized
evidence: Ex parte Jackson, 263 Fed. 110 (D. Mont. 1920) ; United States v. Wong
Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832 (D. Vt. 1899); Schenck v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 766 (D.
Mass. 1938). Cf., Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (lst Cir. 1922).
In Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph, Sup. Ct. D.C., March 11, 1936, commented
upon in N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1936, p. 1 '(not officially reported), the court granted
an order enjoining the telegraph company from complying with a blanket subpoena
issued by the Senate Lobby Investigating Committee on the grounds that it amounted
to an unreasonable search and seizure. See 84 U. PA. L. REv. 904 (1936).
55 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
r See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 670 (1966).
57 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
58d., 93 N.W.2d at 287. However, the court did not hold such error to be grounds for
reversal because of the adequacy of other evidence.
917 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 155 (1960).
60 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951).
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even though the plaintiff had violated the United States' postal laws
in obtaining them," but another court held that a plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights were violated when his estranged wife took letters
from his suitcase, and that the letters should have been excluded.'
However, these and other state court cases are weak authority either
for or against the proposition, since in most of them the court either
handled the issue perfunctorily or relied on the pre-Mapp rules in
criminal cases."3
In the most recent case, Sackler v. Sackler," the issue ran the
gamut of the court system of New York. In a suit for divorce by the
husband, he attempted to prove his wife's adulterous conduct by of-
fering evidence obtained when he and a force of private detectives
illegally entered her apartment. At the trial level, the wife's motion
to suppress this evidence was granted." The appellate division re-
versed three to two,66 and was affirmed by the court of appeals five
to two.
6 7
The Sackler decision resulted in a rash of comments, 8 most of
which did little to clarify the issue. By careful analysis it can be seen
that the question resolves itself into two distinct issues: (1) Does the
fourth amendment protect individuals from illegal searches and seiz-
ures by other individuals? (2) If so, is the exclusionary rule to be
applied to such evidence? Thus, the writers who begin by asking
whether the exclusionary rule, as enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio,6" should
be applied in civil cases, fail to recognize the distinction between the
two issues and thus omit half of the problem. A discussion of the
second issue is valueless unless it is preceded by a determination that
the fourth amendment does apply to the actions of private individuals.
A. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Actions of Individuals
In considering this first question, one argument against the
proposition that the fourth amendment applies in civil cases can be
quickly dismissed. It has frequently been stated that the historical
purpose of the fourth amendment was to protect the citizens against
61 Mercer v. Parsons, 95 N.J.L. 224, 112 Atl. 254 (1920).
62 Kohn v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 2d 459, 55 P.2d 1186 (1936).
63 See Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P.2d 268 (1946).
64 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 '(1964).
65 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1962).
6 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962).
67 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
68 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 407 (1965); 63 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1963); Note, 48 COR-
NELL L.Q. 345 (1963); Note, 31 FORDIIAM L. REV. 390 (1962) ; 25 MD. L. REV. 186
(1965) ; 46 MINN. L. REV. 1119 (1962) ; 43 N.C.L. REV. 608 (1965) ; 41 N.D.L. REV.
559 (1965); Note, 11 N.Y.L.F. 141 (1965); Note, 14 S.C.L.Q. 433 (1962); 16
SYRACUSE L. REV. 884 (1965); Comment, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1043 (1962) ; Note,
YALE L.J. 1062 (1963).
6367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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unfettered governmental action and that this purpose in itself pre-
cludes its application to private action. The majority opinion in
Sackler " cited Boyd v. United States" in support of this proposition.
That the original purpose of the fourth amendment was to protect
against the odious writs of assistance and general warrants is not
questioned." However, the assumption that the historical purposes
should serve to limit all later constructions of the amendment is
questionable, and in light of the recent opinion by the United States
Supreme Court in Frank v. Maryland 3 it seems unlikely that this
limitation will be the case. In Frank the Court said:
While these concerns for individual rights were the historic im-
pulses behind the Fourth Amendment and its analogues in state con-
stitutions, the application of the Fourth Amendment and the extent
to which the essential right of privacy is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are of course not restricted
within these historic bounds.
74
It has also been argued that the Supreme Court has already held
that the fourth amendment does not apply to civil cases by virtue of
its holding in Burdeau v. McDowelPs which stated that evidence un-
lawfully obtained by a private person would not be excluded in a
criminal prosecution since the Constitution does not apply to indi-
viduals." The dissent in Sackler77 argued that Burdeau was implicitly
overruled by the holding in Elkins v. United States7 that evidence
seized by state officers in violation of the fourth amendment was in-
admissible in federal courts. Indeed, Elkins was so construed in dic-
tum in Williams v. United States.7' These cases would seem to be
poor authority since both involve criminal prosecutions. However,
since Burdeau was also a criminal case, it is submitted that it should
not be allowed to preclude a fresh examination of the issues.8"
What then, are the possible constitutional grounds for applying
the fourth amendment to private searches? The first possibility in-
volves the right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination arising
70 15 N.Y.2d 40, 42, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1964).
71 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7 2 
See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS at 427 (7th ed. 1903).
73359 U.S. 360 (1959).
74 Id. at 365-66.
78 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
7
6 Id. at 475. This case was relied on by the majority in the court of appeals decision in
Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 42, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85
(1964).
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out of the "intimate relationship" between the fourth and fifth
amendments. " In Boyd, Mr. Justice Bradley said:
[T]he two amendments ... throw great light on each other. For the'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned
in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is
an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.82
Originally the application of the fifth amendment was limited to
criminal proceedings,83 but it has since been held applicable in civil
proceedings, the only requirement being that it must appear that the
incriminating evidence, if not excluded, could reasonably be said to
lead to a criminal prosecution.84 Analyzed in this light, the evidence
should have been excluded in Sackler since the evidence obtained
could well lead to a criminal prosecution for adultry. Just how heavi-
ly the Court has relied on this formula in criminal cases is not clear.
It was not mentioned in the majority opinion in Weeks v. United
States' or in Elkins v. United States.88 However, in Mapp the Court
indicated that this might have been partly responsible for their hold-
ing when they quoted the language in Boyd which states that the two
amendments run "almost into each other,'87 and indeed, Mr. Justice
Black stated in his concurring opinions in Mapp88 and One 1958
Plymouth Sedan89 that it was this reasoning that persuaded him to
abandon the position he took in Wolf v. Colorado" - that the con-
stitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures did not re-
quire the exclusion of the evidence in state courts.
However, this argument contains the fatal flaw mentioned
earlier in this section. The reasoning used in Boyd, mentioned in
Mapp, and relied on by Mr. Justice Black in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan, was that the fifth amendment was the basis for excluding
evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The fifth
amendment applies to the exclusion of the evidence, not to the seizure
81 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
82Ibid.
83 See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (pts.
1-2), 29 MIcH L. REv. 1, 13-14, 191, 195-96 (1930).
84 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
85232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
87 367 U.S. at 646.
8
8Id. at 661-66.
8 380 U.S. at 703-05.
90 338 U.S. 25'(1949).
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of it. There must be independent grounds for holding that it was
originally seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
Perhaps the most plausible method for accomplishing this is
found in the argument for extending the "state action" concept as
applied in Shelly v. Kraemer.91 This case held that a state court's in-
junction enforcing a private covenant designed to discriminate against
Negroes in the sale of property was state action denying equal pro-
tection. However, neither post-Shelly decisions 2 nor commentators 3
have construed this holding to apply to all judicial conduct which
tends to encourage private behavior in which a state could not con-
stitutionally engage. The present interpretation of Shelly seems to
be that it is limited to instances in which the court is asked to compel
a private citizen to do an act which would be unconstitutional for the
state to perform as opposed to acquiescing in the admission of evi-
dence offered by an individual, which if offered by the government,
would be excluded. 4 Even though the Supreme Court has not shown
any inclination to extend the application of this principle beyond
cases involving racial discrimination," neither has it definitely de-
clined to do so, since the problem of "state action" as it relates to
the fourth amendment in private actions has never directly confronted
the Court. A warrant for its extension to private actions involving
reception of evidence can be found in the realization that if one of
the purposes of the concept is to discourage "private misconduct," it
should make little difference whether the court is asked to enforce
it or merely acquiesce in the reception of its results into evidence.
From this analysis it is evident that the first step in the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to private actions presents serious ob-
stacles. There seems to be no readily apparent basis for holding that
the fourth amendment in any of its judicial interpretations applies to
private actions, and without this there is little practical reason for
considering the second step. One might also avoid a discussion of
this second issue by determining that if the fourth amendment does
apply, the exclusionary rule automatically applies. Indeed, it could
91334 U.S. 1, 15 (1948).
92 In Black v. Cutter Labs, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) the Court refused to apply the Shelly
reasoning when, in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement, the employee
was discharged for membership in the Communist Party. In denying the employee en-
forcement of an arbitration award of reinstatement the Court held that the contract was
of a local nature and did not raise a federal question.
93 See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1108-20 (1960);
Pollack, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. _. REV. 1, 14 (1959).
94 See 46 MINN. L. REV. 119, 1126 (1962) ; 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1064 n.17 (1963).
95 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961 )the Court ap-
plied the state action concept to a Negro who was refused service in a restaurant on prop-
erty leased by the state, but expressly limited its holding to the precise facts of the case.
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be argued that as a result of Mapp, the exclusionary rule is now an
inherent part of the fourth amendment right, and that anytime the
latter is applied the former is also. If reflection on the criminal cases
is of any help, it will be recalled that although the Supreme Court
had been condemning unconstitutional searches and seizures for many
years, it was not until 1914, in Weeks v. United States "' that the
Court decided to enforce it in the federal courts by means of the ex-
clusionary rule. And although in 1949 the Court recognized that the
fourth amendment applied to the states through the due process
clause, 7 it was not until twelve years later in Mapp that they applied
the exclusionary rule to state courts. Thus, even if one concludes
that the remedy is now a part of the right, it is obvious that this is
not so simply because of the inherent nature of the right. In reply
to this it could be argued that we should learn from past mistakes
and short-cut this torturous process by declaring ab initio that the
remedy is inherent in the right. This would indeed foreclose discus-
sion but for the fact that the policy reasons behind the application
of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases are not applicable to civil
cases. 8 Thus, after finding the fourth amendment applicable to civil
cases, the Court may very well be faced with a similar arduous task
of determining which remedy is most appropriate to give protection
to the right.9
B. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule
Assuming then that one of the grounds discussed above is found
sufficient for applying the fourth amendment to private actions, and
also that the exclusionary rule is not to be automatically applied, the
discussion turns to the second issue - Should evidence seized uncon-
stitutionally be excluded in private actions? Many of the arguments
made both for and against the proposition that the rule should apply
miss the point, for they fail to keep in mind the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule. It has been said that the purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule is twofold: (1) To police the law enforcement
agencies; and (2) To protect the civil rights of citizens by deterring
future illegal searches and seizures by the police. 00 This analysis is
misleading, since the purpose of the rule is not to punish the police,
but to enforce the rights of citizens by deterring future illegal searches
and seizures by the police. It was based on the proposition that the
9 232 U.S. 383'(1914).
7 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
98 See generally discussion notes 100-105 infra.
99 Another difficult problem, not considered in this Note, is what standards would be used
to determine if one individual had violated another's fourth amendment rights.
100 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 155, 159'(1960).
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
exclusionary rule would have a prospective effect on police be-
havior.'' Thus, it is ineffectual to argue that since civil remedies
are available against the violator there is no need for the exclusionary
rule." An action in trespass may punish the individual, but it is
doubtful that it will have any deterrent effect."3 Even assuming that
a trespasser would consider the possible civil remedies available
against him, he may proceed nevertheless, in the expectation that the
damages he hopes to collect in his civil action will exceed the amount
he may be required to pay in a trespass suit, since such damages are
usually insignificant."°
The reasons for the application of the exclusionary rule in crim-
inal cases are irrelevant when offered to support the proposi-
tion that the rule should apply in civil actions. The statement that it
is logically inconsistent to make the application of the rule depend on
the nature of the trespasser," while reasonable at first glance, is fal-
lacious when examined closely. It is this very difference between the
government and an individual which supplies the rationale for the
exclusionary rule in criminal cases. The police department is in the
business of detecting crime, and supposedly, the exclusion of illegal
evidence in one case will affect its behavior in the future. The only
possible application of such reasoning in private actions would be in
the case of a detective agency, in which case it could be argued that
the exclusion of the evidence would modify their behavior in the
future. In the case of a private citizen, however, his trespass is
usually a singular affair, and thus in the average case the effect of
the rule would be to punish rather than -to deter. The argument that
the trespasser will not win his case if the evidence is excluded' is
not persuasive, since the purpose of the rule is not to prevent the win-
ning of lawsuits, but to deter future illegal searches and seizures.
Thus, the reasons for the exclusionary rule as applied in criminal
101 That this was the main reason for the holding in Mapp can be shown from the Court's
recognition of the failure of other means to deter the police.
In connection with this California case, we note that the second basis elaborated
in Woil in support of its failure to enforce the exclusionary doctrine against the
States was that 'other means of protection' have been afforded 'the right to pri-
vacy.' 338 U.S., at 30. The experience of California that such other remedies have
been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States. The
obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other
remedies has, moreover, been recognized by this Court ....
367 U.S. at 651-53. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
102 See 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 554 (1965).
103 Suppose for example that A sees his wife enter a motel room with B. Is it reasonable
to assume that he will refrain from entering the room for fear of a civil action in
trespass or invasion of privacy?
104 See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1071 n.59-60 (1963).
105Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 44, 203 N.E.2d 481, 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86
(1964) (dissenting opinion).
106 See article cited note 100 supra.
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cases are inapplicable in private actions, and the only remaining basis
for its application would be the "intimate relationship" between the
fourth and fifth amendments discussed earlier."° If the searches and
seizures are found to be unconstitutional, the most reasonable grounds
for excluding the evidence will be found in the protection of the fifth
amendment.
C. Equitable Considerations
If reliance upon the Constitution as a means of excluding evi-
dence -in private actions appears too hazardous, there are two other
possibilities. The first is based on the theory that the integrity of the
judicial process requires the exclusion of tainted evidence. It has
been relied on at least incidentally in several cases. In Elkins v.
United States"' the Court, in rejecting the "silver platter" doctrine
said, "But there is another consideration - the imperative of judicial
integrity."'" In Sorrells v. United States,11 Mr. Justice Roberts, in a
concurring opinion, stated:
Always the courts refuse their aid in civil cases to the perpetration
and consummation of an illegal scheme. Invariably they hold a civil
action must be abated if its basis is violation of the decencies of life,
disregard of the rules, statutory or common law, which formulate
the ethics of men's relations to each other. Neither courts of equity
nor those administering legal remedies tolerate the use of their
process to consummate a wrong .... The doctrine rests, rather, on
a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its own func-
tions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs
only to the court."'
The principle was stated succinctly in People v. Cahn:112 "Out of re-
gard for its own dignity as an agency of justice and custodian of lib-
erty the court should not have a hand in such 'dirty business.' ""'
However, the above cases were all criminal prosecutions, and the
principle was invoked incidentally. However salutory its purposes, it
would seem a difficult task to convince a court to exclude vital evi-
dence in a civil case solely on this ground.
The second possibility involves the "clean hands" doctrine which
deprives the plaintiff of his cause of action if he has obtained the
right by inequitable means." 4 The most common application of the
doctrine has been to refuse judicial enforcement of illegal schemes,'
10 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
10 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
109 Id. at 222.
110287 U.S. 435 (1932).
111 d. at 455-57.
11244 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
113 Id., 282 P.2d at 912.
114 See McCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 26 (2d ed. 1948) ; 2 POMEROY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 397 (5th ed. 1941).
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or of contracts deemed to be against public policy. " The reasoning
that no one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong..
appears applicable to a fact situation such as that present in Sackler,
where the wrong was a deliberate planned trespass committed for the
sole purpose of using the results as evidence.'
The real question is whether the policy considerations involved
in the above theories are sufficient to overcome the common law doc-
trine that the manner of obtaining evidence is not cause for its sup-
pression in a civil or criminal proceeding."' The purpose of the ju-
dicial inquiry is the ascertainment of the truth, and all relevant and
reliable evidence should be admitted unless the exclusion of the evi-
dence "has a public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." 2'
Public policy has been deemed sufficiently overriding in the instances
of evidence obtained in the course of a husband and wife relation-
ship, 2' or an attorney and client relationship,'22 but the reasoning
here is founded upon the belief that exclusion of the evidence will
tend to preserve and further such relationships in the future,2 and
such a concept of continuity is lacking in illegal searches by private
persons. The most persuasive principles of public policy would seem
to lie in a synthesis of the values espoused in the "contamination"
and "clean hands" doctrines.
D. Conclusion
In summary, it is evident that the question of the application of
the exclusionary rule to civil cases involves a maze of both legal and
policy questions. If the Constitution is relied upon to exclude the
illegally seized evidence, it must be first determined that private ac-
tion falls within the scope of the fourth amendment. The only pres-
ently apparent ground for doing this is to decide that it would be
"state action" for a court to admit evidence which if seized by the
government would have been illegal. If by the use of this concept,
115 The courts often dismiss actions in which the plaintiff has fraudulently lured the de-
fendant into the jurisdiction in which to obtain service. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d
313 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Dunlop & Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260 (1871) ; Abercrombie v.
Abercrombie, 64 Kan. 29, 67 Pac. 539 (1902).
116 Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916); Hazleton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71
(1906).
117 See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 952 (Gavit. ed. 1941).
118 33 Misc. 2d 600, 605, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790, 795 (1962).
119 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
1 20EIkins v, United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (dissent by Mr. justice Frank-
furter).
121 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 82 (1954).
1
22 Id. § 91.
123 Id. § 72.
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the first obstacle is thus overcome, there must be adequate policy rea-
sons for excluding the illegally seized evidence. Since the reasons for
exclusion in criminal cases are irrelevant in civil cases, the most logi-
cal ground for exclusion would be the fifth amendment - that by
admitting over objection evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment, the witness is being forced to testify against himself. In
order to do this, Mr. Justice Black would have to convince a majority
of the Court that this was why they excluded illegally seized evidence
in criminal and quasi-criminal cases.' Aside from these constitu-
tional grounds, the only other apparent reason for excluding the evi-
dence would be based purely on public policy - the integrity of the
judicial process and the feeling that no one should profit from his
own wrong demand that the tainted evidence be excluded.
In the final analysis it appears that the application of the ex-
clusionary rule in private actions is unlikely. Until more persuasive
constitutional grounds are proposed, there appears to be no basis for
the application of the fourth amendment, and until a better enuncia-
tion of the public policy reasons involved is given, it is submitted
that the courts will not so hinder the judicial process in its ascertain-
ment of the truth.
Harry N. MacLean
124 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
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